

DATE: 27 May 1970

TO: Messrs. [REDACTED] /Prector/Smith

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1A 25X1A [REDACTED]  
25X1A

SUBJECT: Law of the Sea Task Force

REMARKS: 25X1A

[REDACTED] of OBGI was over last week discussing this Task Force which will be preparing for international negotiations over the next few years. State Department has asked for Agency participation in a Task Force Subcommittee which would collect data.

Dick felt we should probably have a wider role in the Task Force proper as well as in the Subcommittee. As the lines of coordination would cut across several offices in this Directorate and extend into DDS&T, I asked Dick to write a memo explaining what this was all about and to include a draft memo to State. The Department, incidentally, has been queried informally and would be delighted to have CIA participation.

This is not something you should take much time with and I do not recommend reading all the attachments. You should know about it, however. If you approve of our participation in the Task Force at two levels, I will ask Jim Brammell to go forward with

ACTION

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*Law of the Sea Task Force (use file)*

27 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in the Law of the Sea Task Force

1. The Legal Advisor, Department of State, has asked OBGI to provide assistance to a working group of the recently formed Law of the Sea Task Force (Attachment 1). In my view, the Task Force is concerned with policy matters that will be of increasing importance to CIA. The following paragraphs briefly describe the situation as it stands and the approach I would propose we take.

2. Background

a. The rapid advance of technology over the past ten years has greatly changed the political significance of the oceans. Agreements reached in the Law of the Sea Conferences at Geneva in 1958 and 1960 were incomplete and not wholly viable at the time. New international agreements are needed now to update and revitalize the regime of law covering fisheries, the territorial sea, and use of the continental shelves, and to regulate international practice in matters of pollution and exploitation of the deep seabed. Failure to renegotiate acceptable international codes will result in the continued proliferation of extreme unilateral claims and unrestrained seaward extension of national sovereignty. As one author observes: "It is difficult to overemphasize the importance to the United States of the present international process of forming a future regime of the oceans. The regime will be a very important factor in molding the future world order, in international stability, and in the capability of the United States to enhance its own prosperity . . . ."

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b. In recognition of the implications of this situation for basic intelligence, the Geography Division in 1969 began discussions with The Geographer, Department of State, looking to the joint establishment and interagency development of a comprehensive data bank on national interests in the sea. I subsequently approved the initiation of a pilot effort on five countries according to a draft outline (Attachment 2) that would be coordinated with OCS, OSI, and DDI offices. A tentative query as to NAVOCEANO cooperation brought a strong affirmative response.

c. The Law of the Sea Task Force was formed in January 1970 in response to a White House directive to State to prepare for anticipated bilateral and multilateral negotiations in 1971 and beyond. The purpose of the Task Force, in general, is to prepare and coordinate U. S. negotiating positions for Executive Branch approval; to facilitate necessary consultations with the Congress, industry, and the scientific community; to prepare and coordinate the negotiations themselves; and to create a supporting data bank (Attachment 3). A paralleling activity was the convening of an Under Secretaries Committee meeting to consider the U. S. position on the seabed boundary, the results of which were announced by President Nixon on 24 May. A DDI briefing paper was prepared by OBGI for General Cushman's use in this activity (Attachment 4).

d. We became involved in Task Force affairs when State's Office of the Geographer made the Task Force aware of our proposed data bank outline. The outline, slightly expanded, was subsequently adopted by the Task Force. A trial compilation of data on selected countries has been initiated, essentially as we had envisioned it, with all participant agencies contributing. The formal request for CIA aid followed.

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3. Benefits and Costs of CIA Involvement

a. The Task Force deals with global matters of political, economic, and military geography that are long-standing concerns of OBGI. Representative capabilities and interests of other offices that might be involved are:

- (1) Military use of the seabed (OSI, OSR)
- (2) Commercial exploitation of deep sea areas (OER)
- (3) Foreign attitudes, positions, and conflicts on law of the sea issues (OCI, ONE)
- (4) Ocean-related R&D (OSI)

The Agency has a general interest, also, in the encouragement of negotiations that seek maximum freedom for scientific research and thus for intelligence collection operations. The terms of the Geneva Convention currently in effect have acted to curtail such freedom.

b. The function of the Task Force as an apparatus facilitating interagency action on the data bank will save us much effort and time. We will be able to concentrate more freely on subject areas in which we have special expertise, on the compilation of code-word sub-files to be retained (presumably) in the Agency, and in coordination with OCS on the development of computerized modes.

c. Participation by CIA at the working stages will better assure that intelligence is considered by the Task Force, and is reflected in the policy recommendations reviewed and approved by the Under Secretaries Committee.

d. Outlays by OBGI in support of the Task Force would probably not exceed the equivalent of one full-time analyst. This support would extend over the life of the

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Task Force, perhaps 18 months. A large part of the support would do double duty, in that it would also support our own data base effort and our involvement in the tasks of other interagency activities, such as the Working Group for Formulation of U. S. Policy on the Arctic. Outlays by other CIA offices would normally consist in aiding the preparation of Agency responses to draft Task Force papers and in attending incidental specialists' meetings.

4. If you agree, I would propose to approve Mr. Stevenson's request for our assistance in the work of the Task Force. I would, however, broaden the terms of the assistance to include support of the Task Force overall, not merely support of the Information and Research Working Group (IRWG) as mentioned in the memorandum of request. As CIA Representative to the Task Force at large, I would designate [REDACTED] and as Representative to the IRWG, because of his expertise in this field, I would designate [REDACTED]. Briefings of the concerned offices in the DDI and DDS&T would be undertaken immediately.

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[REDACTED]

✓ JAMES A. BRAMMELL  
Director  
Basic and Geographic Intelligence

4 Attachments:  
as stated

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